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The Sensory Basis of Historical Analysis: A Reply to Post-Structuralism
ERIC KAUFMANN
         
A centrepiece of post-structuralist reasoning is the importance of sign over 
signifier, of language over referent, of text over the world "out there."1 Clearly, for this 
school of thought, concepts are merely signs in the word game of a self-referential 
system. For other post-structuralists, it is the crude socioeconomic power of the actor(s) 
who issue the "performative" utterance of a concept that ensure its validity as a 
"constative" term.2 "Conventional" historians have tended to react in bewildered fashion 
to the new linguistic turn: they have failed to rebut the post-structuralists on their own 
ground, shying away from the grand theoretical fight. Passively yielding this higher 
ground, the conventional historian retreats to her empirical work and middle-range 
generalisation. This is a somewhat myopic tendency that has led to a lack of well-
articulated "conventional" theorizing. This paper attempts to correct this omission by 
welding the unstated, unreflected notions of conventional historians into a coherent 
rebuttal of post-structuralism.
In short, it is claimed that concepts are not formed a priori, detached from the 
world "out there," but instead are based on sensory patterns occurring in the social world. 
Whether these sensory patterns crystallize in our heads because of the way the mind has 
been constructed (Kant's argument in his Critique of Pure Reason)3 or whether they 
accurately represent ultimate reality, is a second-order question which does not affect the 
position taken here. The importance of historical concepts is that they are largely based 
on our shared, spontaneous organization of sensory stimuli, not powerful actors' 
cognitive manipulation of terminology. This is why human beings, regardless of time and 
place, employ similar basic taxonomies and recognize simple concepts like dog, tree and 
mountain.4 
Concepts in the human sciences are not as universally apprehended and sharply-
defined as those in the natural sciences. Yet, the tacitly accepted post-structuralist claim 
that concepts in the natural and human worlds inhabit different existential universes is 
simply unacceptable. The drawing of a sharp epistemological line between concepts that 
describe animal behaviour or biology, and those that describe humans or society, is an 
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anthropocentric conceit that cannot be sustained. Rather than inhabiting two worlds, 
concepts in the natural and human sciences are more properly seen as arrayed along a 
continuum, with physics at one end and, say, cultural criticism at the other. The 
importance of sensory determination declines as one moves from the physical world to 
the human. Nevertheless, the division between the natural and human is not a cliff 
between order and chaos, but represents a gradual slope. Thus concepts in the human 
sciences are still largely founded on a concrete sensory base. This is why the human 
sciences (including history) resemble their counterparts in natural science far more than 
they resemble the random lyrics of psychedelic poetry.
Let us return to the notion of the concept. Two varieties of concept may be 
distinguished: type concepts and variable concepts. Arthur L. Stinchcombe was perhaps 
the first in the social sciences or humanities to explore the nature of the variable/type 
conceptual distinction.5 He began with the idea of the variable concept. A variable 
concept, like religiosity, national product, or anti-semitism, describes a phenomenon 
whose value can vary over time and space. On the other hand, the type concept (i.e. 
Weber's ideal type) refers to a phenomenon that stands outside of history, with values 
that do not vary. Why? Because type concepts arise at the juncture of precise values of 
variables which consistently appear together in the sensory world. For example, we 
recognize a cat as different from a dog, or a table as different from a chair, because each 
phenomenon scores differently on the variables of extension, colour, shape, etc. In effect, 
we devise labels for combinations of values of variables that regularly appear together in 
nature, a phenomenon so statistically unlikely that it strikes us as worthy of a name. 
This is a difficult idea to grasp, so Stinchcombe refers to the example of the 
chemical elements. If one examines a periodic table, one finds that it considers several 
variables such as valence, boiling point and atomic weight. Each of these variables has a 
theoretical range of values from negative infinity to positive infinity. However, is it the 
case that every combination of valence, boiling point and atomic weight can be found in 
nature? No. In fact most combinations of their values are never found. Closer 
examination reveals that only a very small number of combinations actually have been 
observed. That is, whenever we find elementary substances with a certain atomic weight, 
we also find an associated value for valence, boiling point and other variables that 
appears in a patterned way, every time. We could forever refer to how specific value-
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combinations of valence, boiling point and atomic weight relate to other value-
combinations, but this would entail a level of clumsiness that would render scientific 
progress almost impossible. 
Therefore, to simplify reality, we create labels for the value-bundles in the form 
of concepts like helium (atomic weight is 4, valence is this, boiling point that, etc). Since 
variables are based on type-concepts and vice-versa, the entire social construction of our 
reality is based on this process of simplification. If we failed to do this, our entire world 
would appear as a kind of Heraclitean flux. This is why post-structuralism, despite its 
penchant for deconstructing type-concepts, cannot escape from their use - without a 
common stock of typological reference points (i.e. "positivist"), post-structuralists would 
simply talk past each other and fail to develop a scholarly identity. 
The reason type-concepts are possible is because variables in nature are related in 
particular ways. The weight of an atom cannot rise while its boiling point falls, for 
instance. Does the same relationship hold in the world of human interaction? I would 
submit that while variable values are more loosely related in the social world, the sensory 
data we receive from the world "out there" is striking in its lack of randomness. Working 
class, capitalism, warfare, Protestant - all of these type-concepts are based on the fact that 
certain combinations of variable values repeatedly emerge, which is so statistically  
incredible that it strikes us as worthy of a label. 
Let us examine one instance of this sensory coincidence. Many individuals 
possess a low degree of ecclesiastical organization, a high degree of bible ownership and 
a low degree of sensual expression. That these values of these variables are/were 
repeatedly found in the social world is not a random occurrence, but is statistically 
significant enough for us to devise the label "Protestant." Again, what we apprehend is 
not a sensory flux, but a definite patterned distribution of sensory values - which forms 
the basis for concepts in history and the social sciences. The process is not as automatic 
as that of the infant who comes to recognize concepts like "human" and "tree" in its 
awakening to consciousness. Yet it is far closer to the truth than the post-structuralist 
postulate that the sign "Protestant" floats above a sea of sensory chaos. 
In the social world, it appears that there are more phenomena that lie "in 
between" ideal-type concepts than is the case in the physical world. We know that in 
chemistry, one can create "in between" substances like heavy water (H3O). However, this 
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occurs less frequently than "in between" social phenomenon like individuals who call 
themselves Protestants, but manifest a high degree of sensual expression, low bible 
ownership and a belief in hierarchy. Nevertheless, were we to map the type-concept 
"Protestant" in three-dimensional space, we would find a cluster of cases at the node 
where high bible ownership, low sensual expressiveness, low ecclesiastical hierarchy and 
other variables intersect. 
Certainly there would be outliers like the "in between" individuals I described 
above, but this in no way invalidates the sensory basis for the type-concept "Protestant," 
which serves as a useful label for a statistically unusual agglomeration of related 
variable-values. The plain fact is that all historical analysis is based on the reference 
points provided by concepts, which are underpinned by nonrandom sensory occurrence. 
This is what generates meaning, not the post-structuralist conceit that meaning is only 
created by the juxtaposition of signifiers in a self-referential system.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to rebut the post-structuralist contention that concepts are arbitrary 
social constructions which gain their meaning only in relation to other concepts. Instead, 
it is demonstrated that concepts in the human sciences, like those in the natural, are 
underpinned by nonrandom patterns of sensory stimuli. Variable-concepts are used to 
describe phenomena which vary in time and space. Type-concepts, on the other hand, 
occur at the confluence of specific values of variables. As a result, they do not vary over 
time and space. Type-concepts in the social sciences and humanities appear to possess a 
less distinct empirical basis than those in the natural sciences. Nevertheless, type-
concepts in the human sciences are still based on a strikingly nonrandom empirical 
substratum that more closely resembles the natural sciences than it does a world of 
random, sensory chaos. An understanding of this solid empirical foundation can help 
clear conventional historical analysis of terminological confusion and better defend it 
from post-structuralist criticism.
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